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Abstract
Recent experimental studies have used scoring rules to measure beliefs of subjects
engaged in strategic games with other subjects. Using data from one such study, we
conduct a series of experiments where our experienced subjects observe early rounds of
data from that study and are given monetary incentives to report forecasts of choices in
later rounds. We elicit beliefs using three diﬀerent scoring rules: linear, logarithmic, and
quadratic. There are significant diﬀerences between the elicited beliefs under quadratic
and logarithmic scoring rules in spite of both being proper scoring rules. The linear
scoring rule does not always elicit degenerate priors as theory predicts, but does result
in reported beliefs that are closer to 0 and 1 than the proper rules. We also compare the
forecasts of our trained observers to elicited beliefs of the actual players in the
Nyarko-Schotter experiment and find significant diﬀerences. There was a significant
positive correlation between observer forecasts and the choice behavior in the game
under all three of our scoring rules while there was no significant correlation between the
players’ own forecasts and the actual play. This raises doubts about whether beliefs can
be reliably elicited from players who simultaneously have a stake in the target of their
forecast, in this case the opponent’s choice. The distribution of forecasts by NS players
also had more dispersion than the observer forecasts using either of the proper scoring
rules, but slightly less dispersion than the observer forecasts using the linear scoring
rule. We also find evidence of both belief convergence and information aggregation when
beliefs are elicited iteratively from a group.
Keywords: Scoring rules; Experiments; Game theory; Forecasting; Beliefs;
Information aggregation
1 Introduction
Probabilistic beliefs play a central role in mathematical theories of strategic decision
making. In games of strategy, optimal decisions depend on beliefs about other players’
choices, which in turn depend on their beliefs about one’s own decision, and so on.
Many ideas lying at the very foundation of these theories and related concepts in
economics, such as rational expectations and Nash equilibrium are built around strong
assumptions about beliefs. Most attempts to test these theories, often in laboratory
experiments, either measure beliefs indirectly by estimation, or impose maintained
hypotheses about beliefs (such as rational expectations), resulting in tests of joint
hypotheses about beliefs and rational choice. The ability to evaluate or test these
theories more sharply would be greatly enhanced if it were possible to measure beliefs
directly. Indeed, a number of recent attempts of direct measurement of probabilistic
beliefs have been attempted by experimental economists, in the context of strategic
games. Examples include Dominitz and Hung (2004), in the context of information
cascades, Huck and Weizsacker (2002) and Oﬀerman et al. (2006) in the context of
lottery choice experiments, McKelvey and Page (1990) for information aggregation,
Duwfenberg and Gneezy (2000) in trust games, Oﬀerman et al. (1996) and Croson
(2000) in voluntary contribution games,The results of those papers raise questions about
the measurement methodology itself, and its applicability to the elicitation of beliefs in a
strategic environment. Indeed, a striking finding from several of these experiments is the
surprising prevalence of extreme forecasts (degenerate or nearly degenerate forecasts),
which is hard to reconcile with standard theory.
This paper explores four methodological questions and two substantive questions
about the use of scoring rules for the elicitation of probabilistic beliefs about behavior in
strategic games. We undertake this exploration in the context of a simple 2x2
asymmetric matching pennies game similar to the one originally studied by Ochs (1995)
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and more recently by McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber (2000), Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey
(2003), and Nyarko and Schotter (NS, 2002).
The first question is: can beliefs be reliably elicited from the players of a game,
during the play of the game? Unreliable reported beliefs could arise for a variety of
reasons, including psychological factors such as rationalization, or via distortion of
incentives because they are also being paid according their play in the game, which
violates the "no-stakes" condition of Kadane and Winkler (1988). We address this
question by comparing the elicited beliefs of (experienced) observers to the elicited
beliefs of the players themselves. Our subjects observe real sequences of choice behavior
from the NS data, and are asked to make probabilistic one-move-ahead forecasts of the
play of the game, as the sequence is played back to them in real time, using scoring rules
to incentivize the forecasts. Because the NS subjects also made incentivized
one-move-ahead forecasts, this allows for a direct comparison.
The other three methodological questions address the issue of whether the choice of
the scoring rule makes a diﬀerence: Are forecasts elicited using proper scoring rules
systematically diﬀerent from those elicited using improper scoring rules? Are forecasts
elicited via two diﬀerent proper scoring rules the same or diﬀerent? Are forecasts better
calibrated for some scoring rules than others? With these latter two questions in mind,
we conduct an experiment with three diﬀerent treatments, each corresponding to a
diﬀerent scoring rule. The three scoring rules used are logarithmic (proper), quadratic
(proper), and linear (improper).
The substantive questions both concern information aggregation and belief
convergence of subjective beliefs. First, are individuals in a group able update their
beliefs in response to the forecasts of other members of the group? (belief convergence)
Second, if such convergence occurs, are individual forecasts improved by group
interaction? (information aggregation) To address these questions, our experiment
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includes a second feature that allows for information aggregation. Our observers were
placed in groups of four, and there were two sequential rounds for each forecast. The
entire profile of individual forecasts of group members was revealed between the two
rounds, so each individual had an opportunity to update his or her forecast in response
to the forecasts of the other group members. This allows us to test for belief convergence
(comparing the variance of first round to second round forecasts) and information
aggregation (comparing the accuracy of first round and second round forecasts).
We have five main findings. First, there is a significant diﬀerence between the
elicited beliefs under quadratic and logarithmic scoring rules in spite of both being
proper scoring rules. Forecasts elicited by the logarithmic scoring rule have less
dispersion (closer to (.5,.5)), and are better calibrated than forecasts under the
quadratic scoring rule according to several diﬀerent measures. Second, the linear scoring
rule does not always elicit degenerate priors, but does result in reported beliefs that are
closer to 0 and 1 than the proper rules, and these forecasts are more poorly calibrated.
Third, the forecasts by our observers were more accurate than the forecasts of the NS
players, in the sense that the average elicited forecast was closer to the true choice
frequencies in the data for all three scoring rules. Furthermore, there was a significant
positive correlation between observer forecasts and the choice behavior in the game for
all three of our scoring rules while there was no significant correlation between the
players’ forecasts and the actual play. This reinforces doubts about whether beliefs can
be reliably elicited from players who simultaneously have a stake in the target of their
forecast, in this case his opponent’s choice. Fourth, the distribution of forecasts by NS
players had more dispersion than the observer forecasts using either of the proper scoring
rules, but slightly less dispersion than the observer forecasts using the linear scoring
rule. Fifth, we find evidence of both belief convergence and information aggregation.
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1.1 Related Literature
1.1.1 Scoring rules
Scoring rules, which yield payoﬀs as a function of vector of probabilistic forecasts and a
realized event, are used to elicit subjective probabilities in laboratory and real-life
settings. Diﬀerent scoring rules have diﬀerent incentive compatibility properties.
Because elicitation methods are used to uncover "true" probabilistic beliefs, incentive
compatibility is an important criterion for the "goodness" of any scoring rule. A scoring
rule is classified as proper if it is incentive compatible. In the scoring rule literature, a
scoring rule is considered incentive compatible if a forecaster cannot attain a higher
expected score by reporting a probability diﬀerent than her true probability.
Brier (1950) and Good (1952) were the first to identify two such proper scoring rules,
quadratic and logarithmic, respectively. Since then, both the quadratic and logarithmic
scoring rules as well as another well-known one, the spherical scoring rule, have been
shown to be strictly proper (Winkler and Murphy 1968), meaning that the expected
utility is uniquely maximized when the stated probabilities are equal to the true
probabilities. Savage (1971) specifies the general rule for generating the class of strictly
proper scoring rules and there have been numerous comparative studies of desirable and
undesirable properties of proper scoring rules such as quadratic, logarithmic, spherical,
ranked probability, and utility. (De Finetti 1965; Roberts 1965; Murphy 1969; Winkler
1969; Staël von Holstein 1970). Kadane and Winkler (1988) have studied the eﬀect of
risk aversion on forecasts under the quadratic scoring rule. Oﬀerman et. al. (2006) and
Fountain (2002) propose procedures to adjust for non-neutral risk attitudes.
1.1.2 Previous experimental results about scoring rules
The quadratic scoring rule is the most common one used in both laboratory and field
experimental settings for the forecasting of subjective events such as weather forecasting
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(Staël von Holstein 1971), stock market prices (Staël von Holstein 1972), and outcomes
of sporting competitions (Winkler 1971), and game theory (see below). The logarithmic
scoring rule has been used to a much lesser extent in experiments on education testing
(Hambleton et. al. 1970; Glein and Wallace 1974) and information aggregation
(Ledyard et. al. 2005).
A few articles have examined whether the ranking of forecasters remain consistent
under diﬀerent scoring rules (Staël von Holstein 1971) by eliciting the subjective
probabilities using one scoring rule (quadratic) and calculating the scores under other
proper scoring rules (logarithmic, spherical, and ranked probability) with those
subjective probabilities. One study (Nelson and Bessler 1989) compares the number of
extreme probabilities elicited under a proper scoring rule (quadratic) vs. an improper
one (linear). Phillips and Edwards (1966) compare the accuracy and improvement of the
subjects’ Bayesian inference under several scoring rules.
Existing experimental results about the use of scoring rules to elicit subjective
beliefs about action choices in a strategic game are mixed. In the context of two person
matrix games, extreme reported beliefs (beliefs with 25% or less likelihood for one of the
states) are observed with surprising frequency (Dominitz and Hung 2004, Nyarko and
Schotter 2002). Because the "true" frequencies of target states is generally between .35
and .65 this indicates inaccuracies in the forecasts. Furthermore, beliefs are erratic, in
the sense that they change much faster from period to period than a Bayesian model
would predict, indicating that forecasts are not only inaccurate, but highly imprecise
(Nyarko and Schotter 2002, fig. 2, p. 980). If the players were adjusting beliefs
according to Bayes rule or even according to a simple counting procedure, truthful
reporting of beliefs would have a smoother trajectory than what was actually observed.
There is also evidence from two person laboratory games that the process by which
subjects decide on a forecast is qualitatively diﬀerent from the decision process they use
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to make a decision, which can sometimes result in forecasts that are inconsistent with
choice behavior (Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker 2006).
In contrast, Dominitz and Hung (2004), in the context of an information cascade
experiment, report that players’ forecasts are dampened relative to Bayesian reports. In
particular, they find that subjects often fail to change their forecasts in response to hard
information, which suggests distortions in the elicitation procedure. The task was much
diﬀerent from the our task of one-step-ahead forecasts of choices in a repeated game,
since their subjects were repeated forecasting a static target (the state of the world),
rather than a stochastically moving target. Oﬀerman et al. (1996) elicited subjective
probabilistic beliefs about the level of contributions of other players in a voluntary
contributions game. Some of the forecasts were degenerate, bimodal, or implausible for
other reasons, and they confirm the finding reported by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991)
that subject beliefs about others’ contributions are biased upward. Nevertheless, the
authors conclude that expectations appear to be reasonable.
There is also mixed evidence about the similarities and diﬀerences between forecasts
elicited from observers and forecasts elicited from players themselves. Huck and
Weizsacker (2002) elicit forecasts from subjects who observe decision makers in a simple
(objective) binary lottery choice task. They find some inaccuracies, notably that the
forecasts are closer to 50/50 than the actual choice frequencies of the subjects, and that
this doesn’t depend in a significant way on the elicitation procedure. This is in stark
contrast to the forecasting behavior measured using an identical quadratic scoring rule
in the NS experiment, where reported beliefs of players are biased in the opposite
direction. The combination of these two findings is completely at odds with findings
reported in Oﬀerman et al. (1996, p. 828), where observers submitted forecasts that
were more dispersed than those submitted by the players themselves.
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1.1.3 Convergence of beliefs
Our iterative elicitation method could induce a common knowledge inference process
whereby individual beliefs adjust after others’ beliefs are revealed. In the common
knowledge literature, Aumann (1976) first established that if two agents have the same
common prior, their posterior probability of an event must be the same if the posteriors
are common knowledge. The subsequent work of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1982), McKelvey and Page (1986), and Nielsen et al. (1990) are more closely related to
the possible process generated by our iterative elicitation method. Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis show that with iterated exchange of information between the agents, the
inference process would terminate at a point where the posterior probabilities are equal.
McKelvey and Page demonstrate that for the case with n agents and public knowledge
of a summary statistic, the iterated reactions to the public statistic would lead to
consensus and complete pooling of private information held by the agents. Winkler
(1968) takes a diﬀerent approach and compares two mathematical methods of combining
one-shot individual forecasts into an aggregate one without any informative interaction
between the forecasters. He considers the eﬀect of the weighted-average method and the
combining natural-conjugate method as well as the choice of weights under both on the
aggregate probabilities.
Related to our iterative elicitation method are experiments in which subjects receive
feedback about other subjects’ forecasts (McKelvey and Page 1990; Oﬀerman and
Sonnemans 1998; Choi et. al. 2005; Winkler 1968). With the exception of Winkler’s
experiment in which he elicits forecasts about subjects with intrinsic uncertainty such as
the weather or sports through a questionnaire, the rest induced diﬀerences in private
information in the laboratory and focused upon the eﬃciency of private information
pooling when there is objective uncertainty. These studies report some belief
convergence as measured by the reported forecasts of these objective events.
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2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Simple Matrix Game
This is the simple matrix game that was used in the Nyarko-Schotter experiment and in
ours as well.
Green Red
Green 6, 2 3, 5
Red 3, 5 5, 3
Table 1. Matrix game payoﬀs.
This is a constant sum game with an unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
that is supported by the principle of best responses and Nash equilibrium. In equilibrium
both players choose Green with 40% probability and Red with 60% probability.
2.2 Three Scoring Rules
Scoring rules, which compute a numerical score as a function of the stated probabilities
as well as the realized event, are often used in forecasting and experimental settings to
assess the accuracy of forecasts. In our experiment, this score also specifies the monetary
payoﬀ. A scoring rule is proper if the subject maximizes her expected monetary payoﬀ
by revealing her true belief. We first characterize the three scoring rules used in the
three belief elicitation treatments of our experiment. We then go on to show that the
quadratic and logarithmic scoring rules are proper whilst the linear scoring rule is not.
2.2.1 Preliminaries
Let i = 1 , 2 , ..., n denote the n possible events and let p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) be the subject’s
stated probability distribution where pi is the stated probability of event i. Define the
scoring rule S = {S1, S2, ..., Sn} as a collection of scoring functions where Si(p) specifies
the score when event i is realized as a function of the subject’s stated probability
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distribution p. Let π = (π1, π2, ..., πn) be the subject’s true probability distribution
where πi is the true probability of event i. Ii is an indicator function that takes the
value 1 if the realized event is event i and 0 otherwise.
2.2.2 Characterization
1. Quadratic Scoring Rule:
Si(p) = α− β
nX
k=1
(Ik − pk)2 (1)
where α, β > 0
The quadratic rule scores the inaccuracy of the forecast as the sum of the square
deviations and deducts it from the full score. This deviation is the probability
placed on those events that were not realized as well as the probability not placed
on the event that was realized. We will now focus on the specific case of the
general quadratic scoring rule that pertains to our belief elicitation experiment.
There only two possible events, the event that a player chooses Green, which we
denote as G, and the event that a player chooses Red, R. In our experiment as
well as in the Nyarko-Schotter experiment, α is chosen to be 1 and β is chosen to
be 0.5. The score if event G occurs is therefore:
SG = 1− 0.5((1− pG)2 + (0− pR)2)
= 1− (1− pG)2
= 1− p2R
Similarly, the score if event R occurs:
SR = 1− 0.5((1− pR)2 + (0− pG)2)
= 1− p2G
= 1− (1− pR)2
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The worst that a subject can do is to place the maximum probability on the event
that is not realized and the best she can do is to place that same probability on the
realized event. Under this quadratic specification, her score can never be negative.
2. Logarithmic Scoring Rule:
Si(p) = α+ β(logpi) (2)
where α, β > 0
The logarithmic rule deducts for inaccuracy by adding the natural log of the
probability placed on the realized event (a negative number since 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1) from
the base score. The less the probability placed on the realized event, the greater is
the deduction. The score is −∞, however, when zero probability is placed on the
realized event. Because of this property, implementation in practice requires
bounding the forecasts away from zero. We place bounds on the maximum (0.9)
and minimum (0.1) probability a subject can place on any event. We set α to be 1
and β to be 0.45. The score if event G occurs in the logarithmic treatment:
SG(p) = 1 + 0.45(logpG)
The corresponding score if event R occurs:
SR(p) = 1 + 0.45(logpR)
Under this specification, the subject would only receive a negative score (−0.036)
if she places the maximum probability on the event that does not occur.
3. Linear Scoring Rule:
Si(p) = β(pi) (3)
where β>0
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The linear scoring rule simply gives the probability placed on the realized event as
the score. In the linear treatment, we set β to be 1 so that the prediction score
when G is realized is simply pG and likewise it is pR when R is realized.
2.2.3 Properties
Selten (1998) specified four axioms and asked which axioms each of the three scoring
rules satisfy. The symmetry axiom simply requires that scores should not be dependent
upon the labeling of the events. The elongation invariance axiom states that the scores
for the realization of each possible event should not be altered by the addition of an
impossible event. The incentive compatibility axiom is equivalent to the properness
condition we defined above. This is the property of scoring rules that has been
scrutinized most intently for obvious reasons. Lastly, the neutrality axiom requires that
the score does not favor any particular event in deducting for inaccuracy. For example,
in the case of only two events, G and R, placing maximum probability on R when G
actually occurs should result in the same expected score loss as placing maximum
probability on G when R occurs.
1. Quadratic Scoring Rule: Selten shows that the quadratic scoring rule is the only
one out of the three to satisfy all four axioms. In particular, it is the only scoring
rule that satisfies the neutrality axiom. We will focus on the incentive compatible
axiom in the relevant two-event case. The subject’s expected payoﬀ given her true
belief π:
E(PO) = πG(1− p2R) + πR(1− p2G)
= πG(1− (1− pG)2) + (1− πG)(1− p2G)
11
The first order condition is:
πG(1− pG) = (1− πG)pG
Since this condition is satisfied when the subject’s stated forecast, p, is equal to
her true belief, π, the quadratic scoring rule is incentive compatible or proper.
2. Logarithmic Scoring Rule: Although the logarithmic scoring rule does not satisfy
the neutrality axiom, it does satisfy the other three and most significantly the
incentive compatibility one. Hanson (2007) gives a summary of other potentially
desirable properties of the logarithmic scoring rule. Under this rule, the subject’s
expected payoﬀ given her true belief is:
E(PO) = πG(1 + 0.45logpG) + πR(1 + 0.45logpR)
= πG(1 + 0.45logpG) + (1− πG)(1 + 0.45log(1− pG))
The corresponding first order condition is:
πG
1− pG
=
1− πG
1− pG
Again, the subject’s stated forecast must be the same as her true belief to satisfy
this condition and maximize her expected payoﬀ. Therefore the logarithmic
scoring is also proper.
3. Linear Scoring Rule: The linear scoring rule violates not only the neutrality axiom
but more importantly the incentive compatibility axiom as well. The expected
payoﬀ is:
E(PO) = πGpG + πRpR
= πGpG + (1− πG)(1− pG)
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If the subject’s true belief is the Green is more likely to be played, πG > 0.5, then
she maximizes her expected payoﬀ under the linear rule by stating a forecast of
100% probability on event G. Similarly,if she believes that Red is more likely to be
played, πG < 0.5, then she maximizes her expected payoﬀ by placing 100%
probability on event R.
3 Experimental design and procedures
We conduced six sessions with a total of 48 subjects. The subjects were registered
students at a US university,who were recruited by email solicitation. Sessions were
conducted in a computer lab and all interaction was computerized. No subject
participated in more than one session. The primary treatment variable was the scoring
rule, either log, quadratic, or linear, with one third of the subjects in each treatment.
Each session had two parts. In the first part, subjects were randomly assigned to be
either the row player or the column player in the 2x2 game in Table 1. Keeping the
pairings fixed, they played the game repeatedly for 5 rounds. After round 5, they are
assigned to the opposite role so that if they were a row player in the first five rounds,
they are now a column player and vice versa. They are also randomly repaired with a
diﬀerent player and play the game repeatedly for 5 rounds with this new opponent.
Their earnings for Part 1 was the sum of their earnings over all 10 rounds of play. The
purpose of part 1 of the session was to familiarize the subjects with the strategic
problem facing players of this game.
In part 2, subjects made "observer" forecasts about the sequence of choices of either
the row or the column player in seven diﬀerent pairs from the Nyarko-Schotter
experiment. In each session, four of the subjects were assigned the task of forecasting
behavior of row players (row forecasters) and four were assigned the task of forecasting
the choices of column players (column forecasters) These roles were fixed throughout
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part 2. For each of the seven pairs whose play they were asked to forecast, all subjects
are told the actions chosen by both players in that pair in the first five rounds of their
match. The matrix game and the list of actions chosen by the pair in the first five
matches are displayed on every subject’s computer screen throughout this part of the
experiment. Row forecasters are then asked to report their probabilistic beliefs about
the likelihood the row player in that pair chose red or green in round six, and column
forecasters are asked to report their probabilistic beliefs about the likelihood the column
player in that pair chose red or green in round six. This is implemented by requiring
them to type in two positive integers, one for green and one for red, where the two
numbers must add up to 100. All the column predictors simultaneously make forecasts
in this manner about the actions of the same column player in round 6 of the same
match from the NS experiment, and all the row forecasters simultaneously make
forecasts in this manner about the actions of the same row player of the same match
from the NS experiment.
After reporting these forecasts, all row forecasters are told the forecasts of all the
other row forecasters, and all column forecasters are told the forecasts of all the other
column forecasters. The subjects are then allowed to modify their original forecast. This
is implemented by having them re-enter two positive integers, one for red and one for
green, that sum up to 100. The revised forecasts of all the row predictors are shown to
the row forecasters, and likewise for the column forecasters.
Subjects are then paid for their forecasts using a scoring rule that is described
carefully in the instructions. Due to the possible incentive distortions that iterative
elicitation may have on the proper scoring method, only one of the two forecasts a
subject makes is randomly selected for payment.
After the second round of forecasts, the actual choices by the row and column
players in round 6 of that NS pair are then reported back to the subjects, so they now
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know the choices by both subjects in the first six rounds of the match. They are also
told which of their two forecasts was randomly chosen for actual payoﬀ, and the payoﬀ
is computed for them and appears on their screen. A history panel at the bottom of the
client screen keeps track of all this information, and new information is appended to the
history panel as the experiment proceeds. All subjects then proceed to make forecasts
about round 7 of that NS pair, in the same manners as they made forecasts about round
6. Roles (row or column forecaster) stay fixed. As in round 6, subjects are allowed to
revise their forecasts once, in light of the forecasts of other subjects in the same role.
They continue in this way to make iterative forecasts for the play in rounds 8, 9, and 10
of that NS pair. This procedure was then repeated during the session for six other NS
pairs. Thus, overall, subjects reported and revised forecasts about a total of 35 plays of
the game by 7 diﬀerent pairs. They were paid the sum of their earnings in each round.
Instructions were read aloud to the subjects. A copy of the instructions is available
from the authors upon request. After the session ended, all subjects were paid one at a
time in private. Total earnings, including a show-up bonus of $10, ranged from $17 to
$35. In the log and quadratic treatments, forecasts were constrained to be between 10
and 90. Because such a constraint is necessary in the log treatment to avoid bankruptcy
problems, it was also included in the quadratic treatment for consistency. The
constraint was not imposed for the linear scoring rule since the theoretical prediction for
the linear scoring rule is at the boundary, i.e., forecast either 0 or 100.
4 Results
We analyze the results in two subsections. First, we describe the main aggregate
features of the initial elicitation data, before subjects have had the chance to revise their
forecasts in light of the forecasts of others. We compare the distribution of forecasts
across treatments, across roles. We also compare our data with the distribution of
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forecasts elicited from NS subjects in rounds 6-10 of that experiment and to the
aggregate frequency of choices observed in their data.
Second, we analyze the accuracy of the forecasts. We use two benchmarks:
uninformed forecasting (always forecasting 50/50) and rational expectations (forecasting
the empirical average frequency in every round). We refer to 50/50 forecasts as
uninformed because such a report is optimal for a forecaster whose prior is uniform on
[0,1].
Third, we investigate questions about the iterative elicitation process. Does it lead
to convergence of beliefs? Does the iterative process lead to better forecasts?
Finally, we try to answer the question of whether the distributions of beliefs we
observe are biased in any systematic ways, compared to the forecasts of a fully rational
model of belief elicitation with risk neutral subjects.
4.1 Individual forecasts: Comparison of scoring rules and
comparison with NS
4.1.1 Distributions of initial forecasts
We first do a comparison of the first-round forecasts across the three treatments,
averaged over all subjects in our experiment, broken down by role and scoring rule.
If the beliefs are the same for observers and players of the game, and if there are no
distortions created by having a subject report beliefs and choose actions at the same
time as in NS, then there should be no significant diﬀerences between the NS elicited
beliefs and the beliefs elicited from observers using the quadratic scoring rule. Because
the log scoring rule is also proper, there should be no diﬀerences between our log and
quadratic treatments and there should be no diﬀerences between the log elicitations and
the NS elicitations.
The first row of Table 2 describes the row players’ elicited beliefs about the column
player’s likelihood of choosing green, and the second row describes the column player’s
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elicited beliefs about the row players’ likelihood of choosing green. In this and
subsequent tables, "column" refers to column moves or forecasts about column moves.
"Row" refers to row moves or forecasts about row moves. The first three columns give
the average forecast under our three scoring rule treatments. The fourth column is the
average forecast in rounds 6-10 of NS experiment 1 (i.e. the same rounds our subjects
were forecasting), and the final column gives the actual choice frequencies in those
rounds.
Two observations are immediate, both concerning the accuracy of forecasts. First,
the NS players and our own subjects systematically underestimate the probability
column will choose green and overestimate the probability that row will choose green,
but these diﬀerences are not significant . Second, this bias is less in all of our treatments
and for both player roles than in the NS elicitation from the actual players. However,
only the diﬀerence between the forecasts of the row player’s actions under the linear
scoring treatment and the NS forecasts is significant.
Quad Log Lin NS Quad Observed
Column 45.7∗ 47.7∗ 45.5∗ 44.3 55.7
Row 48.8∗ 47.4∗ 43.4∗+ 53.0 42.9
N 560 560 560 140 140
Table 2. Average reported beliefs and actions by role and elicitation method.
* = less biased than NS forecasts. + = significantly less biased than NS forecasts (p=.05).
Another way to compare the forecasts of our observer subjects with the forecasts of
the actual players of the game is to look at raw correlations between the two. Table 3
reports these raw correlations for row and column players separately and also pooling
the two, using the average first round forecasts of each of our groups of four subjects,
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matched with the forecasts of the corresponding NS subject. We find systematically
positive correlations for our quadratic scoring rule treatment, but not for the log or
linear scoring rules. To test for significance of these diﬀerences, we ran a Tobit
regression of the mean of our elicited beliefs under quadratic treatment on the
corresponding NS elicitations. The coeﬃcient is significant at the 5% level for the
quadratic treatment. In contrast, we cannot reject the hypothesis that our log and
linear elicitations are uncorrelated with the elicited beliefs of the NS players. This
suggests that the specific choice of elicitation method is an important factor since NS
also used a quadratic scoring rule.
Quad Log Linear
Row 0.094 −0.12 −0.023
Column 0.20 0.15 −0.052
Overall 0.17 −0.0081 −0.045
Table 3. Correlation between average Observer forecasts and matched NS forecasts.
Quad Log Linear
Row 0.038(0.049) −0.035(0.035) −0.014(0.073)
Column 0.13(0.073) 0.037(0.029) −0.056(0.12)
Overall 0.087 ∗ (0.043) −0.0022(0.023) −0.038(0.068)
Table 4. Coeﬃcients of Tobit regressions of average Observer forecasts on NS forecasts.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗=significantly non-zero (p=.05)
The results from Tables 3 and 4 show that the three scoring rules we use with
observers clearly do lead to diﬀerent measurements of beliefs. To explore this further, we
examine the diﬀerences in dispersion across our three measures and look at how these
dispersions compare with the NS elicitations. According to the theoretical results, we
know that quadratic and log are both proper scoring rules, so we hypothesize no
significant diﬀerence between the dispersion in beliefs for log and quadratic. In contrast,
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the linear scoring rule is not proper; indeed, optimizing risk neutral subjects will report
beliefs equal to either 0 or 1. We hypothesize the linear elicitation procedure will result
in greater dispersion than the quad or log methods.
In addition, if the beliefs of the quadratic scoring rule were the same for observers
and players of the game, and if there are no distortions created by having a subject
report beliefs and choose actions at the same time as in NS, then there should be no
diﬀerence between the player forecasts and the observer forecasts, at least under the two
proper scoring rules. We hypothesize that there will be no diﬀerences in dispersion
between NS forecasts and the observer forecasts using quadratic and log scoring rules.
To measure dispersion, we compute the absolute diﬀerences from 50 for each
individual forecast. The average of these absolute diﬀerences across all forecasts in each
treatment, broken down by row and column, are reported in Table 5, with the complete
CDF of the diﬀerences displayed in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Individual forecast dispersions under
the three scoring rules and NS.
The diﬀerences are striking. First, the NS player forecasts and linear forecasts
exhibit more dispersion than the forecasts by observers with proper scoring rules. The
diﬀerences are not only significant, but large in magnitude, with the NS dispersions
more than double the log scoring rule dispersion and the 50% greater than the
dispersion of observer quadratic elicited beliefs.
Second, the linear scoring rule leads to the greatest dispersion, with the comparison
to log and quadratic significant for observers, as theory predicted. Overall, the linear
forecasts are more dispersed than the NS forecasts and this diﬀerence is significant
except for column players’ behavior. Third, the observer forecasts using quadratic and
log scoring rules are significantly diﬀerent, with the dispersion under the quadratic
scoring rule more than 50% more than under the log scoring rule.
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Quad Log Linear NS
Column 13.53∗(0.86) 11.45∗(0.55) 26.68(1.07) 24.53(2.01)
Row 19.31∗(0.92) 8.89∗(0.57) 36.74∗(1.01) 23.37(1.78)
Overall 16.42∗(0.64) 10.17∗(0.40) 31.71∗(0.77) 23.95(1.34)
Table 5. Dispersion of beliefs, measured by individual average absolute diﬀerence from 50.
Standard error in parenthesis.
∗=significantly diﬀerent from NS (p=.05)
Similar conclusions follow if one compares the dispersion of the average (across 4
subjects) first round forecast by our subjects rather than the individual dispersion
(which adds an additional source of variance). The only diﬀerence is that the
group-averaged dispersion is always less than the individual dispersions. Now, the
ordering of NS and linear is reversed, due to group averaging, which eliminates the
individual sources of variance of the absolute diﬀerences. However, this diﬀerence
between NS and linear is not significant for the forecasts of row choices. These grouped
dispersion measures are given in Table 6.
Quad Log Linear NS
Column 10.28∗(0.90) 7.31∗(0.62) 14.69∗(1.30) 24.53(2.01)
Row 13.77∗(1.24) 5.72∗(0.51) 22.88(1.79) 23.37(1.78)
Overall 12.03∗(0.78) 6.51∗(0.41) 18.79∗(1.16) 23.95(1.34)
Table 6. Dispersion of beliefs, measured by group-averaged absolute diﬀerence from 50.
Standard error in parenthesis.
∗=significantly diﬀerent from NS (p=.05)
These diﬀerences can be clearly seen in Figure 1, which graphs the CDF of the
average individual forecast absolute diﬀerences from 50 for the three observer treatments
and NS, as well as in Figure 2, which graphs the CDF of the group average dispersions.
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Figure 2. Group-averaged dispersions under the
three scoring rules and NS.
We conclude that, in terms of extremeness, the elicited beliefs by players in the NS
experiment closely resemble the beliefs that are elicited from trained observers using a
linear scoring rule. We define extreme forecasts to be those that place 25% or less or
75% or more on the probability of Green being played. The NS and linear elicitation
procedures resulted in the measurement of extreme forecasts 44.5% and 66.2%
respectively compared to 34.3% for quadratic and 9.6% for log. Both procedures elicited
significantly fewer fully-hedged (50/50) beliefs, even less frequently with NS than linear
(7.9% vs. 11.8%). This is consistent with an interpretation of player-elicited beliefs in
terms of "rationalization," whereby players report beliefs in a way that will be
consistent with their actual choices.
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4.1.2 Accuracy of reported beliefs: Do the subjects know anything?
In the actual NS experiment, and also in our experiment using trained observers, the
subjects clearly think they know something. Over 92% of the time, they report
"informed" beliefs, i.e., forecasts diﬀerent from 50/50. We observe nearly the identical
evidence that trained observers believe they have some information about behavior in
our linear treatment, but considerably less so in the proper scoring rule treatments. See
Table 7.
Quad Log Linear NS
Column 0.39 0.16 0.14 0.10
Row 0.25 0.35 0.09 0.06
Overall 0.32 0.26 0.12 0.08
Table 7. Fraction of forecasts exactly equal to 50/50.
It is then natural to ask whether this apparent confidence is justified. We find that
for NS subjects, it is clearly unjustified. We document this more carefully in this section,
but the bottom line is apparent from Table 2 in the previous section that shows forecasts
of row and column actions to be systematically biased and on the wrong side of 50/50.
In contrast, we find evidence that the trained observers in our three treatments
seem to have some forecasting ability. The first thing we look at is the raw correlation
between forecasts and the choices they are forecasting. These are given in table 8. The
overall correlations between forecasts and actions is highly significant for all three
trained observer treatments. In contrast, one cannot reject the hypothesis that NS
forecasts and actions are completely uncorrelated. Breaking this down by row and
column forecasts, we find that in one case (column) they are positively correlated and in
the other (row) they are negative correlated but not significantly. We also ran probit
regressions of actual choice on observer forecasts by treatment and role and the patterns
(sign and significance) in the coeﬃcients match the correlations.
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Quad Log Linear NS
Column 0.179∗ 0.136∗ 0.061 0.123∗
Row 0.121∗ 0.027 0.157∗ −0.044
Overall 0.135∗ 0.085∗ 0.116∗ 0.022
Table 8. Correlation between individual elicited forecast and actual choice in the experiment.
∗significantly non-zero (p=.05)
Table 9 compares the "hit rates" for the forecasts, where hit=1 if the green forecast
is greater than 50 and green is chosen, or if the green forecast is less than 50 and red is
chosen. Forecasts of 50/50 count as 1/2 a hit. Misses are scored as 0. Thus, completely
uninformed forecasting will lead to a hit rate of .50.
Quad Log Linear NS
Column 0.561∗(0.023) 0.527(0.027) 0.514(0.028) 0.521(0.023)
Row 0.559∗(0.026) 0.539(0.024) 0.582∗(0.028) 0.500(0.023)
Overall 0.560∗(0.017) 0.533(0.018) 0.548∗(0.20) 0.511(0.023)
Table 9. Hit rates by treatment. ∗significantly diﬀerent from 0.50 (p=.05)
First, note that all the hit rates are .5 or higher, so subjects are at least doing no
worse than uninformed forecasting! The NS hit rate is not significantly diﬀerent from 0
for either column or row forecasts, or overall. Hit rates are generally higher for trained
observers: in the quadratic treatment, both row and column forecasts are significantly
informative at the 5% level, the overall and row forecasts are significant greater than .50
at the 5% level for the linear treatment and at the 10% level for the log treatment. So,
by either measure, correlation or hit rates, the NS players are uniquely unjustified in
believing they actually know something about how their opponent is likely to play.
A third way of assessing the accuracy of forecasts across scoring rules is to look at
the mean squared deviation (MSD) of the forecast errors. For this we consider several
baselines. The zero-information baseline is based on the MSD that would result by
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always forecasting 50/50. This is equal to .25, and is a plausible upper bound on MSD
for any informed forecaster who reports beliefs truthfully. The Nash equilibrium
baseline is the MSD that would result, given the actual choice data, if one forecasted the
Nash equilibrium mixed strategy every time. The NS forecast baseline is the MSD if an
observer had simply used the NS player’s forecast. The NS empirical baseline is the
MSD if one always forecast the empirical round 6-10 choice frequencies of the player one
whose behavior one is forecasting. It is a plausible MSD lower bound. Finally, we
computed a baseline using the NS empirical choices using rounds 6-10 of all 14 pairs.
These baselines are summarized in Table 10.
MSD Row Column Overall
Uninformed 0.250 0.250 0.250
Nash 0.271 0.246 0.259
NS forecast 0.309 0.343 0.326
NS empirical 0.183 0.189 0.186
NS empirical (all pairs) 0.247 0.245 0.246
Table 10. MSD Baselines.
Table 11 gives the MSD scores for the quadratic, log, and linear scoring rule
forecasts. None of the scores are below .25, suggesting that individuals forecasts on
average have little more content than random guesses. The linear MSD scores are by far
the worst and line up closely with the NS forecasts, which is consistent with other
similarities between the two as noted above. However, this is partly due to the fact that
the linear forecasts are almost certainly exaggerated (closer to 0 and 1 than true beliefs)
as theory would predict. Since actual choice behavior is very close to 50/50, this
exaggeration is "punished" by the MSD score in much the same way as a quadratic
scoring rule would punish it. The log and quadratic scoring rules produce the lowest
forecast error by this measure, with the log MSD lower than the quadratic MSD for both
row and column forecasts. In fact, the log MSD is not significantly diﬀerent from 0.25.
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Quad Log Linear NS
Column 0.259 0.255 0.339∗ 0.309∗
Row 0.280∗ 0.260 0.342∗ 0.343∗
Overall 0.270∗ 0.257 0.341∗ 0.326∗
Table 11. Average forecast errors measured by Mean Squared Deviation.
∗=significantly diﬀerent from 0.25 (p=.05)
Forecast Calibration We also use the calibration method (Seidenfeld 1985) to
evaluate the accuracy of the subjects’ forecasts. By Seidenfeld’s definition, "a set of
probabilistic predictions are calibrated if p percent of all predictions reported at
probability p are true." A subject is perfectly calibrated in our experiment if for all the
instances when she forecasted Green being played with 30% probability, Green is played
30% of the time, for all the time when she forecasted Green being played with 60%
probability, Green is played 60% of the time, and so on.
We pool the forecasts across subjects to obtain a single aggregate calibration
measure for each scoring rule. We also generate a comparable calibration measure for all
subjects in the Nyarko-Schotter experiment, using their round 6-10 forecasts. We take
every ten percentage points as one bin for the predicted probability of Green being
played and calculate the corresponding Green action frequency for that bin. Each bin
takes the lowest percentage as its value when we compare it to the frequencies for the
calibration. For example, 10-19% is 10% probability that Green is played, 20-29% is
20% probability that Green is played, and so on. There is actually little distortion in
this approach because most of the stated probabilities in each bin are at the lowest
percentage.
Table 12 shows the corresponding frequency of Green action for each of the
predicted probability bins under the diﬀerent treatments in our experiment as well as in
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the Nyarko-Schotter belief elicitation treatment. Bins that had less than five
observations of play, 90-99% under logarithmic scoring rule and 10-19% in NS, were
dropped. The numbers in this table generate the calibration curves in Figure 2. If the
forecasts were perfectly calibrated, the line would have a slope of 1. Here we observe
that the slope is significantly less than 1 for our three treatments and NS. The frequency
of accurate forecasts, Green being played in this case, is less than the forecast
probabilities suggesting that subjects were overconfident in their forecasts.
(ID=Insuﬃcient Data: N<5)
Forecast Quadratic Logarithmic Linear NS
0 ID ID 40.6 46.2
10 36.1 30.0 62.5 ID
20 47.7 48.1 40.7 46.2
30 38.5 41.2 53.3 41.7
40 37.5 49.7 52.4 58.8
50 52.9 48.2 57.4 50.0
60 61.7 56.7 55.2 52.6
70 58.2 60.6 42.5 45.5
80 64.7 83.3 52.6 50.0
90 51.3 ID 66.7 75.0
100 ID ID 58.1 33.3
Table 12. Forecast of Green vs. frequency of Green.
ID=Insuﬃcient Data (N<5)
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Figure 3. Forecast of Green vs frequency of Green.
We run OLS regressions of the action taken (100 for Green, 0 for Red) on the
individual stated probability of Green being played and use the coeﬃcient as a
calibration measure. The coeﬃcient would be 1 if the subjects are perfectly calibrated.
As reported in Table 13, we find that the coeﬃcients are all nonzero with statistical
significance under all three of our treatments whereas we cannot reject that the
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coeﬃcient is zero for the NS experiment. Furthermore we find that the subjects are
similarly calibrated under the quadratic and logarithmic scoring rule and are
substantially less calibrated under the linear scoring rule.
Elicitation Constant Green Prob. N R2
Quadratic 34.88* 0.30* 560 0.018
(4.94) (0.095)
Logarithmic 34.50* 0.31* 560 0.0072
(7.64) (0.15)
Linear 42.13* 0.16* 560 0.014
(3.34) (0.058)
NS 47.64* 0.034 140 0.0004
(8.40) (0.15)
Table 13. OLS regression of player actions on forecast probabilities. ∗ = significantly
diﬀerent from 0 (p=.05)
4.2 Learning from others’ forecasts
Our experiment had two key design features that allow us to look at questions of
information aggregation. First, for each action decision to be forecast, we elicited
forecasts from four trained observers, rather than just one. Second, there were two
rounds of forecasts, and each forecaster was advised of the forecasts by the other
forecasters before reporting a second round forecast. In this section, we address two
specific questions about the eﬀects of group feedback on forecasts and how the answers
depend on the scoring rule.
1. Do subjects update their forecasts after learning the forecasts of the other
forecasters? (belief convergence)
2. Are updated forecasts more accurate than initial forecasts? (information
aggregation)
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4.2.1 Belief Convergence
To address question 1, we first compute the percentage of the subjects change their
forecast in the second round after being told the other forecasters’ reports. The answer
is yes, forecasters revise their reports in response to the reports of other forecasters.
Quad Log Linear
Column 0.32 0.60 0.46
Row 0.41 0.54 0.38
Overall 0.37 0.57 0.42
Table 14. Frequency of revisions.
Quad Log Linear
Column 3.31 (0.39) 5.20 (0.38) 10.73 (1.09)
Row 9.06 (0.96) 6.24 (0.53) 12.46 (1.44)
Overall 6.18 (0.53) 5.72 (0.33) 11.60 (0.90)
Table 15. Average revision (absolute value). Standard errors in parenthesis.
As further evidence, we look at the change in the variance of forecasts in the group,
defined as the variance of second stage forecast - variance of first stage forecast. If the
forecasts are closer together in the second round (negative change in variance), we take
that to be evidence of belief convergence. Table 16 displays these change in variance by
position and treatment. We do find that the within-group variance does decline from the
first round to the second round for all three scoring rule treatments. Table 17 shows
that while there were significantly more instances of decrease rather than increase in
forecast variance in the quadratic and linear scoring rule treatments, the log treatment
resulted in a close to even split before decrease and increase in forecast variance.
Quad Log Linear
Column -51.36∗ -36.14∗ -161.18∗
Row -77.24∗ 8.77 -23.04
Overall -64.30∗ -13.69∗ -92.11∗
Table 16. Changes in Variance. ∗ = significantly diﬀerent from 0 (p=.05)
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Quad Log Linear
Less Variance 0.51 0.49 0.61
No Change 0.24 0.04 0.10
More Variance 0.24 0.48 0.29
Table 17. Directional change in variance.
4.2.2 Information Aggregation
To address question 2, we compare the MSD of first round forecasts to the MSD of
second round forecasts. Table 18 displays the average change in MSD (second round
minus first round). The changes are negative in all cases except the linear forecasts of
row choices, but the magnitudes are rather small and statistically insignificant. If we ask
what percentage of the revised estimates are more accurate, we find that revised
forecasts are more accurate more often than less accurate in all cases, but again, the
diﬀerences are small. The exact numbers are given in Table 19.
Quad Log Linear
Row 0.0042 -0.0011 0.0077
Column -0.0123 -0.0012 -0.0168
Overall -0.0040 -0.0012 -0.0045
Table 18. Average change in MSD.
Quad Log Linear
More Accurate 0.44 0.49 0.54
No Change 0.24 0.03 0.09
Less Accurate 0.33 0.49 0.37
Table 19. Directional change in MSD.
5 Conclusions
The experiment reported here produced several findings on the elicitation of beliefs with
scoring rules. First, the forecasts by our observers under all three scoring rules were
more accurate than the forecasts of the NS players, in the sense that the average elicited
forecast was closer to the true choice frequencies. Furthermore, there was a significant
positive correlation between observer forecasts and the choice behavior in the game for
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all three of our scoring rules, while there was no significant correlation between the
players’ forecasts and the actual play being forecasted. Second, the distribution of
forecasts by NS players had more variance, in the sense of being more extreme, than the
observer forecasts using either of the proper scoring rules. The distribution of forecast
dispersions (diﬀerences from 50/50) most closely resembled the distribution of forecasts
elicited from observers under the linear scoring rule with only slightly less dispersion.
Third, the linear scoring rule does not always elicit extreme priors, but does so
frequently and generally results in reported beliefs that are significantly more extreme
than the two proper rules. The linear forecasts are also less well calibrated. Fourth,
there is a significant diﬀerence between the elicited beliefs under quadratic and
logarithmic scoring rules in spite of both being proper scoring rules. Forecasts elicited
by the logarithmic scoring rule have significantly less dispersion. However, we did not
observe diﬀerences in accuracy or calibration for the two rules. The relative accuracy of
the two varied across our diﬀerent accuracy measures. Fifth, we find significant evidence
of both belief convergence and information aggregation.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these results. We summarize our
findings in terms of the answers they give to the four methodological questions and two
substantive questions posed in the introduction of the paper.
1. Can beliefs be reliably elicited from the players of a game, during the play of the
game? The first two findings described above raise serious doubts about the
reliability of beliefs elicited from players who simultaneously have a stake both in
the accuracy of their forecast and in the outcome itself, in this case an opponent’s
choice in a two person game. We also identified what one could call an
overconfidence bias in player-forecasts, relative to the forecasts of experienced
observers. A deeper exploration into the sources of this bias is an interesting topic
for future research. A possible explanation is rationalization: players report
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forecasts that reinforce their choice.
2. Are forecasts elicited using proper scoring rules systematically diﬀerent from those
elicited by improper scoring rules? Yes, as implied by the third finding listed
above. Both proper scoring rules elicit forecasts from our observers that are
significantly more accurate and better calibrated than those elicited under the
linear scoring rule. The direction of the bias caused by linear forecasts is clear: the
linear scoring rule elicits more extreme forecasts as predicted by standard theory.
Nearly one-third of the forecasts elicited under proper scoring rules are fully
hedged, compared to fewer than 10% under the linear rule. The large percentage
of extreme forecasts under the linear rule, and the fact that these observations are
scattered across an even higher percentage of our subjects, suggests that risk
aversion is a relatively weak factor in our data.
3. Do diﬀerent proper scoring rules elicit similar forecasts? Yes. The main diﬀerence
between forecasts elicited under logarithmic and quadratic scoring rules was that
the quadratic rule elicited more extreme beliefs than the logarithmic rule. The
distribution of extremeness of forecasts under the quadratic rule stochastically
dominates the distribution under the logarithmic rule. It is interesting that this
did not result in either one eliciting more accurate or better calibrated forecasts on
average than the other. Why we observe this diﬀerence is an open question. The
procedures used were identical, except for the scoring rule, and it seems
implausible that the diﬀerence is due to subject heterogeneity and sampling
variation. Risk aversion is not a plausible explanation either. While risk aversion
can distort reported forecasts, if subjects have constant relative risk aversion, there
is virtually no diﬀerence in the theoretical distortion that would result under the
two rules. Loss avoidance may be a possible explanation for the diﬀerence in
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boundary forecasts, but cannot explain the stochastic dominance finding. Other
possibilities, such as ambiguity aversion and other violations of expected utility
theory are worth pursuing in future research, but are beyond the scope of this
paper.
4. Are elicited forecasts more accurate and/or better calibrated under some scoring
rules than others? Yes, but these diﬀerences are relatively small compared with
the diﬀerences in how extreme the forecasts are. The accuracy of the rules is
clearly ordered by the MSD measure. The log rule was the only rule that produced
an MSD that was not significantly worse than always reporting an uninformative
prior (50/50). The linear rule was clearly the worse under this measure, with an
MSD very close to the MSD of the NS players’ forecasts.
5. Are individuals in a group able to update their beliefs in response to the forecasts of
other members of the group?
We found significant frequency of forecast revisions from the first round to the
second round in all three scoring rule treatments. The within group variance of
second round forecasts is significantly less than the variance of first round
forecasts. That is, forecasts are converging. Convergence is evidence that they are
learning from each other.
6. Are individual forecasts improved by group interaction? Second round forecasts are
more accurate than first round forecasts as measured by the MSD, although the
magnitude of improvement is small and statistically insignificant. This suggests
something beyond simply belief convergence, since it is theoretically possible for
beliefs to be converging but become less accurate as precision and accuracy are
two diﬀerent things.
The choice of scoring rule to elicit probabilistic beliefs about subjective events can
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make a big diﬀerence. The distribution of our elicited beliefs under the three scoring
rules are significantly diﬀerent from each other in important ways. Second, our results
bolster support for evidence elsewhere that the elicitation of beliefs directly from
players, simultaneously playing the game for which they are forecasting outcomes, is
unreliable. In light of this, anomalies that have been cited in the literature about play
being inconsistent with beliefs (e.g., Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker 2006) are not
surprising. The evidence for unreliability is suﬃciently convincing at this point, that a
reasonable position might be that the use of such procedures provide data that is at best
unreliable and at worst misleading. Our own view is more neutral, and one hopes that
more reliable methods can be discovered. In the meantime, forecasts elicited directly
from players should be interpreted cautiously with the expectation that they may be
flawed in some of the ways identified here.
35
References
[1] Aumann, R. J. (1976): "Agreeing to Disagree" Annals of Statistics 4, 1236-1239.
[2] Brier, G. (1950): "Verification of Forecasts Expressed in Terms of Probability"
Monthly Weather Review, 78, 1-3.
[3] Choi, S., D. Gale and S. Kariv (2005): "Behavioral Aspects of Learning in Social
Networks: An Experimental Study" Advances in Behavioral and Experimental
Economics (Advances in Applied Microeconomics series), J. Morgan ed., JAI Press.
[4] Costa-Gomes, M. and G. Weizsacker (2006): "Stated Beliefs and Play in Normal
Form Games" Working Paper, University of York, U.K.
[5] de Finetti, B. (1965): "Methods for Discriminating Levels of Partial Knowledge
Concerning a Test Item" British Journal of Mathematical and Statistical
Psychology, 18, 87-123.
[6] Dominitz, J. and A. Hung (2004): "Homogeneous Actions and Heterogeneous
Beliefs: Experimental Evidence on the Formation of Information Cascades"
Working Paper, Carnegie Mellon University, U.S.A.
[7] Fountain, J. (2002): "Eliciting Beliefs from Risk Averse Forecasters Using a Log
Scoring Rule" Working Paper, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New
Zealand.
[8] Geanakoplos, J. D. and H. M. Polemarchakis (1982): "We Can’t Disagree Forever"
Journal of Economic Theory, 28, 192-200.
[9] Glein, I. N. and J. B. Wallace Jr. (1974): "Probabilistically Answered
Examinations: A Field Test" The Accounting Review, 49, 363-366.
36
[10] Goeree, J., C. Holt, and T. Palfrey (2003). "Risk Averse Behavior in Generalized
Matching Pennies Games" Games and Economic Behavior, 45, 97-113.
[11] Good, I. J. (1952): "Rational Decisions" Journal of the Royal Statistical Society B,
14, 107-14.
[12] Hambleton, R. K., D. M. Roberts, and R. E. Traub (1970): "A Comparison of the
Reliability and Validity of Two Methods for Assessing Partial Knowledge on a
Multiple-Choice Test" Journal of Educational Measurement, 7, 75-82.
[13] Hanson, R. (2007): "Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules for Modular Combinatorial
Information Aggregation" Journal of Prediction Markets, forthcoming.
[14] Huck S. and G. Weizsacker (2002): "Do Players Correctly Estimate What Others
Do? Evidence of Conservatism in Beliefs" Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization, 47, 71-85.
[15] Kadane, J. and R. Winkler. (1988), "Separating Probability Elicitation from
Utilities" Journal of the American Statistical Association, 83, 357-63.
[16] Ledyard J., R. Hanson, and T. Ishikida (2005): "An Experimental Test of
Combinatorial Information Markets" Working Paper.
[17] McKelvey, R. D., and T. Page (1986): "Common Knowledge, Consensus, and
Aggregate Information" Econometrica, 54, 109-127.
[18] McKelvey, R. D., and T. Page (1990): "Public and Private Information: An
Experimental Study of Information Pooling" Econometrica, 58, 1321-1339.
[19] McKelvey, R. D., T. Palfrey, and R. Weber (2000): "The Eﬀects of Payoﬀ
Magnitude and Heterogeneity on Behavior in 2x2 Games with Unique Mixed
Strategy Equilibria" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 42, 523-48.
37
[20] Murphy, A. H. (1969): "On the ’Ranked Probability Score’" Journal of Applied
Meteorology, 9, 360-364.
[21] Nelson, R. G. and D. A. Bessler (1989): "Subjective Probabilities and Scoring
Rules: Experimental Evidence" American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 71,
363-369.
[22] Nielsen, L.T., A. Brandenburger, J. D. Geanakoplos, R. D. McKelvey, and T. Page
(1990): "Common Knowledge of an Aggregate of Expectations" Econometrica, 58,
1235-1239.
[23] Nyarko, Y. and A. Schotter (2002): " An Experimental Study of Belief Learning
Using Elicited Beliefs" Econometrica, 70, 971-1005.
[24] Ochs, J. (1995) "Games with Unique Mixed Strategy Equilibria: An Experimental
Study" Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 202-217
[25] Oﬀerman, T. and J. Sonnemans (1998): "Learning by Experience and Learning by
Imitating Successful Others" Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 34,
559-575 .
[26] Oﬀerman, T., J. Sonnemans, and A. Schram (1996): "Value Orientations,
Expectations, and Voluntary Contributions in Public Goods" Economic Journal,
106, 817-45.
[27] Oﬀerman, T., J. Sonnemans, G. van de Luilen, and P. Wakker (2006): "Correcting
Proper Scoring Rules for Risk Attitudes" Working Paper, Erasmus University,
Netherlands.
[28] Palfrey, T. and H. Rosenthal (1991): "Testing Game-Theoretic Models of Free
Riding: New Evidence on Probability Bias and Learning" in Laboratory Research in
38
Political Economy (T. Palfrey, ed.), University of Michigan Press:Ann Arbor,
239-67.
[29] Phillips, L. D. and W. Edwards (1966): "Conservatism in a Simple Probability
Inference Task" Journal of Experimental Psychology, 72, 346-354.
[30] Roberts, H. V. (1965): "Probabilistic Prediction" Journal of the American
Statistical Association, 60, 50-62.
[31] Savage, L. J. (1971): "Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations"
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 66, 783-801.
[32] Seidenfeld, T. (1985): "Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules" Philosophy of
Science, 52, 274-294.
[33] Selten, R. (1998): "Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule"
Experimental Economics, 1, 43-62
[34] Staël von Holstein, C.-A. S. (1970): "Measurement of Subjective Probability" Acta
Psychologica, 34, 146-159.
[35] Staël von Holstein, C.-A. S. (1971): "An Experiment in Probabilistic Weather
Forecasting" Journal of Applied Meteorology, 10, 635-645.
[36] Staël von Holstein, C.-A. S. (1972): "Probabilistic Forecasting: An Experiment
Related to the Stock Market" Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 8,
139-158.
[37] Winkler, R. L. (1968): "The Consensus of Subjective Probability Distributions"
Management Science, 15, B61-B75.
[38] Winkler, R. L. (1969): "Scoring Rules and the Evaluation of Probability Assessors"
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 64, 1073-1078.
39
[39] Winkler, R. L. (1971): "Probabilistic Prediction: Some Experimental Results"
Journal of the American Statistical Association, 66, 675-685.
[40] Winkler, R. L. and A. H. Murphy (1968): "’Good’ Probability Assessors" Journal
of Applied Meteorology, 1, 751-758.
40
